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Introduction
Protecting people against the financial risk of illness 
has always been the leading motive of governments in 
advanced democratic countries (and elsewhere) to intro-
duce national health insurance, financed either by social 
contributions or taxes (Mossialos et al., 2002; Saltman 
et al., 2004). National health insurance draws upon the 
concept of solidarity, which holds that citizens, at least 
to some extent, should share costs to guarantee access 
to health services (Saltman, 2015; Stjernø, 2009; Ter 
Meulen et al., 2001). Since its inception, the scope of 
national health insurance has gradually extended in 
terms of people and services (Companje et al., 2009). 
Nowadays, in almost all European OECD-countries, 
public health expenditures account for at least 70 per-
cent of total health expenditures, and the percentage of 
the population covered by national health insurance is 
almost  everywhere close to 100 percent (OECD, 2017). 
Nevertheless, one also finds remarkable differences. An 
important difference regards the fraction of long-term 
care in total health expenditures (Colombo et al., 2011; 
Companje, 2014). For instance, using data from 2015, 
the share of residential care in total health expenditures 
is much higher in Norway (16.4%), Sweden (16.2%) and 
the Netherlands (24.5%) than in Belgium (10.3%), France 
(6.9%) and Germany (8.9%) (own calculation based on 
OECD health data 2017).
Growing concerns on escalating expenditures altered 
the health policy agenda in the 1970s (Cutler, 2002). Cost 
control evolved as an important health policy issue, for 
instance by cutting prices, setting expenditure ceilings, 
introducing co-payments, priority setting, hospital plan-
ning, tightening guidelines for need assessment, removing 
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health services from the benefit package, and so forth 
(Stadhouders et al., 2016). Some countries implemented 
major reforms in national health insurance (Carrera et 
al., 2008; Maarse et al., 2015; Stadhouders et al., 2016; 
Thomson et al., 2013).
A great deal of empirical research of cost control and 
health insurance reform concentrates on their effect 
upon health expenditures and the organisation of health 
services (OECD, 2015; OECD, 2018; Stadhouders et al., 
2018). This article follows a different approach by put-
ting the focus on the impact of reforms on solidarity. The 
study of the solidarity effect of reforms is an important 
topic of research not only because it has been rather 
neglected so far (some exceptions are Stock et al., [2007] 
and Maarse and Paulus [2003]), but also because reforms 
may have consequences for solidarity. It is no coincidence 
that the Council of the European Union emphasized the 
need to respect social values in reforms (Council of the 
European Union, 2006). Evidence on the solidarity effect 
of reforms is a valuable complement to evidence on their 
effects on expenditures and organisation of health and 
long-term care services. Another reason to focus on sol-
idarity-effects is the concern that demographic and cul-
tural changes, as well as rising health expenses, may put 
solidarity under strain in the (near) future (Jeurissen & 
Sanders, 2007).
To gain insight into the effects of reforms on solidar-
ity in national health insurance, this article compares 
two recent reforms in the Netherlands. The first is the 
introduction of a new health insurance scheme in 2006, 
and the second reform is the overhaul of long-term care 
insurance in 2015 (Schut et al., 2013). The policy objec-
tives of both reforms were related to solidarity, though 
each in its own way. An important objective of the 2006 
reform was to reinforce solidarity in health care insurance 
by the introduction of a single national scheme to put an 
end to the traditional separation between social and pri-
vate health insurance. The 2015 reform of long-term care 
insurance was also intended to preserve solidarity into the 
future. One reason the government held a reform as nec-
essary was to prevent escalating expenses that would put 
solidarity in long-term insurance under strain.
Our research questions are twofold: First, what are the 
effects of the 2006 reform of health insurance and the 
2015 reform of long-term care insurance on solidarity in 
health care and long-term care, respectively? Second, did 
these reforms have similar or different effects on solidar-
ity in health care insurance and long-term care insurance?
The concept of solidarity
Solidarity lacks a common understanding. In the litera-
ture (mainly philosophical and sociological), one finds 
many conceptualizations of solidarity and many types 
of solidarity (Bayertz et al., 1999; Ter Meulen, 2017). 
The motives for solidarity also diverge and may change 
over time (Clasen and Van Oorschot, 2002). Solidarity is 
closely related to deservingness, but the questions of who 
deserves what, when and how yields different answers 
(Van Oorschot, 2000). Another problem is the radical 
absence of a single way to translate solidarity in practice 
(Saltman, 2015). Policymakers who declare adherence to 
the principle of solidarity may nevertheless have quite 
different ideas about how to shape a solidary health 
insurance scheme in practice.
The focus in this article is upon formal solidarity in 
national health and long-term care insurance. Solidarity 
in this specific context means people are somehow pro-
tected against the financial risk of illness by sharing the 
costs of health care (e.g., the costs of doctor consultations, 
hospital care and prescription medicines) and the costs 
of long-term care (e.g., the costs of nursing home care). 
The purpose of national health and long-term care insur-
ance arrangements is to remove financial obstacles to the 
utilization of health and long-term care services. In other 
words, these arrangements are an important instrument 
for improving access to health and long-term care services.
The focus on solidarity in national insurance schemes 
implies that informal solidarity arrangements in paying 
for health and long-term care (e.g., family solidarity) are 
left out of consideration. This also applies to other types of 
informal care (e.g., caring for one’s family members, friends 
or neighbors) and solidarity arrangements organized by 
voluntary and charitable organizations. Furthermore, we 
pay attention to intergenerational solidarity.
Analytical framework
To study the solidarity effects of health insurance reforms, 
we developed an analytical framework of solidarity. This 
framework has two main dimensions: coverage and 
financing. Each dimension consists of several sub-dimen-
sions (see Table 1). Thus, solidarity is conceptualized as a 
multidimensional concept.
National health insurance differs in several respects 
from private health insurance. Most private insurance pol-
icies are based on the principle of actuarial fairness, also 
known as the equivalence principle. This principle holds 
that the policy holder’s premium is related to risk: higher 
risks are ‘normalized’ by higher premiums (absence of risk 
solidarity). Many private plans also include access restric-
tions by instituting exclusion waivers for pre-existing 
medical conditions or non-acceptance (Stone, 1993; Light, 
1992; Lehtonen & Liukko, 2011). Material coverage and 
cost coverage are often less extensive in private health 
plans than in national health insurance. Income solidarity 
is also uncommon in private plans. In short, private health 
insurance is much less solidary than national health insur-
ance. Another important difference is the mandated 
structure of national health insurance, which means that 
solidarity in national health insurance is imposed or obli-
gated solidarity. Its mandated structure raises the ques-
tion of public support for national health insurance. The 
same issues apply if considering insurance for long-term 
care. However, this question is beyond the scope of this 
article (Gevers et al., 2000).
Methods
To investigate the solidarity-effects of the reform of 
health care insurance and long-term care insurance in 
the Netherlands, we performed a qualitative analysis of 
government policy documents to determine a solidarity-
score for each dimension in the pre-reform period and 
the score in the after-reform period. Comparison of these 
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scores gives insight into the consequences of the reforms 
for solidarity. In this respect, a number of remarks are 
important.
First, we determine the ‘solidarity-score’ for each 
dimension separately and abstain from aggregating the 
scores into a composite score. This method enables us to 
identify the multiple effects reforms may have on soli-
darity. A composite score would also require a weighting 
procedure. However, attaching weights requires a politi-
cal judgment of the relative importance of each dimen-
sion, which is beyond the scope of our analysis. For this 
reason, we abstained from a weighting procedure. Hence, 
in our analysis a change in the score on population cov-
erage is considered as equally important as a change in 
the score on risk-solidarity.
Second, changes in solidarity are classified into four cat-
egories: more solidary, less solidary, no change and mixed 
change. The classification was performed by a multidisci-
plinary team consisting of one PhD-researcher, two health 
economists, one expert in social security legislation with 
a legal background and one health policy expert with a 
background in political science.
Third, it is important to emphasize that the solidarity-
effects are dependent on one’s original position. As will 
be shown below, the effects for people who in the pre-
reform period were covered by the sick fund scheme 
(sick fund insured people) can differ from the effects for 
persons with a private scheme (privately insured people). 
The effects for privately insured people are contingent 
on the specific regulations in their private plan and their 
personal situation (e.g., single or married, number of 
children and age).
Fourth, to get a good picture, it is necessary to study 
the longitudinal solidarity-effects of reforms. Their 
immediate effects (effect in the first year of imple-
mentation) may differ from their effects over a longer 
period.
Solidarity in the pre-reform period
Health care insurance
Until 2006, approximately two-thirds of the population 
was covered by the Sick Fund Act (Ziekenfondswet), a social 
arrangement based on the German ‘Bismarck’ model of 
statutory health insurance and in force since 1964. The 
sick fund scheme covered employees with earnings under 
a state-set earnings ceiling (yearly adapted by the govern-
ment). Employees with earnings above this ceiling were 
not eligible. Most of them purchased a private health 
insurance policy as a substitute (Vonk, 2013). There were 
also two specific sick fund schemes in place, one for self-
employed workers and another for the elderly. The sick 
fund scheme covered a wide range of medical services, 
including family care, specialist care, hospital admissions, 
pharmaceuticals and many others. Because co-payments 
were largely absent, cost coverage was very high. Condi-
tions for coverage did not exist.
As regards financing, the scheme also featured a high 
degree of solidarity: contributions were income-related 
(with a cap) and not linked to medical risk (Kroneman et 
al., 2016). In contrast, the arrangements in private health 
insurance were less solidary. Private insurers could deny 
applications, restrict coverage and charge risk-related 
premiums. In practice, they usually applied a combina-
tion of community-rating and risk rating. Particularly in 
the 1970s and early 1980s, the private health insurance 
market ran into trouble. Some groups (e.g., self-employed 
people on low income) had great difficulty in purchas-
ing a private plan. Private insurers also undermined the 
financial stability of the sick fund scheme of the self-
employed by offering preferred risk groups an attractive 
premium. To tackle both problems, the government intro-
duced temporary reforms to protect solidarity in private 
health insurance and to improve solidarity between the 
sick fund insured and persons with private health insur-
ance (Schut, 1995).
Table 1: A multidimensional model of solidarity.
COVERAGE
Population coverage (breadth) refers to the portion of the population covered by national health and long-term care  insurance. 
National health insurance is considered more solidary if it covers a greater portion of the population. Insurance schemes that 
give specific groups of people the option to take out substitute private health insurance (e.g., Germany) is less solidary than 
schemes covering the entire population. Solidarity is also less in countries where only specific categories of people are eligible 
for national health legislation (e.g., the Netherlands before the 2006 reform).
Material coverage (depth) refers to the package of health and long-term care services covered. National insurance is considered 
more solidary if it covers a broader set of services.
Cost coverage (height) refers to the percentage of the costs of health and long-term care services covered. National insurance is 
considered more solidary if it covers a greater portion of the costs. Co-payments reduce cost coverage and, hence, solidarity.
Conditional coverage refers to conditions that must be met to qualify for coverage. Restrictions to coverage (e.g., the 
 requirement that people must quit smoking to qualify for expensive medical care) are considered less solidary than 
 arrangements without restricting conditions.
FINANCING
Income solidarity means that financing rests upon the principle of ability-to-pay. The more national health and long-term care 
insurance schemes draw upon this principle, the higher the extent of solidarity in financing.
Risk-solidarity holds that a policyholder’s health condition is not taken into account in rate- setting. Insurers are also  forbidden 
to apply exclusion waivers or to deny applicants access to insurance. National health and long-term care insurance schemes 
respecting the principle of risk solidarity are considered more solidary than arrangements that deviate from this principle.
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Long-term care insurance
The Netherlands was the first country in Europe that 
introduced a separate national insurance scheme for 
long-term care (Companje, 2014). The Exceptional Medi-
cal Expenses Act (Algemene Wet Bijzondere Ziektekosten) 
came into force in 1968 and was shaped as a statutory 
scheme covering the entire population (universal cover-
age). Initially, the material coverage of the scheme was 
limited and only included nursing home care and resi-
dential care for people with a handicap. In the course 
of time, however, the benefit package extended, with 
ever more services in a residential and non-residential 
setting. The scheme covered both services of long-term 
health care (e.g., nursing home care, personal health 
care services) and social services of long-term care (e.g., 
household services, public transportation and personal 
guidance). The bulk of long-term care is provided as 
benefit-in-kind (Kroneman et al., 2016; Mot, 2010; Schut 
& Van den Berg, 2010). However, since 1995 clients 
may apply for a publicly-funded cash benefit to pay for 
long-term care. Cost coverage has always been exten-
sive (see Table 3). Co-payments were related to income, 
type of care, assets and family situation (single or living 
together). Means testing has always been forbidden. 
To be eligible for long-term care, an applicant had to 
undergo a need assessment procedure. The financing of 
long-term care insurance was solidarity-based: contribu-
tions were income-related (a fixed percentage of earn-
ings set annually by the state) and not related to health 
risk. Taking an international-comparative perspective 
(Companje, 2014), the Dutch system of long-term care 
can be depicted as a formalized and rather generous 
system that is for the most part publicly financed. The 
provision of long-term care services is in the hands of 
private not-for-profit providers. Long-term care is also 
expensive: in 2014 its share in gross domestic product 
was 4.3% (compared to 5.4% for health care). It was for 
this reason that one observer called Dutch long-term 
care ‘world champion’ long-term care (Companje, 2014).
Solidarity in health care insurance after reform
Health care insurance underwent a major reform in 2006 
(see also Table 2). The introduction of the Health Insur-
ance Act (Zorgverzekeringswet) integrated the former sick 
fund scheme and all private health insurance schemes in 
a mandatory basic health insurance scheme covering all 
legal residents of the Netherlands. Each person is free to 
choose his/her insurer and may switch to another insurer 
by the end of each year (6.4% did so in 2017 [Vektis, 
2018]). Legislation obligates insurers to accept each appli-
cant (open enrolment). Since 2008, health insurance con-
tains a mandatory deductible set by the minister of health 
(see next section for more details). The minister of health 
also determines the benefit package of the basic schemes. 
Subscribers pay both a nominal (flat-rate) premium and 
income-related contribution (capped). While the minister 
of health sets the contribution rate, health insurers set the 
nominal premium of their own health policies. However, 
they are forbidden to apply risk-rating; community-rating 
is obligated. Free premium-setting is intended to spur com-
petition in health insurance. The policy assumption is that 
competition will incentivize insurers to increase efficiency 
in contracting with providers. Preferred risk selection is 
forbidden. A complex risk equalization scheme is in place 
to compensate insurers for differences in risk profile. The 
state pays the premium for children under 18. Nominal 
premiums, the mandatory deductible and the state grant 
for children account for 50% of all revenues; the remain-
ing 50% is covered by the income-related contributions.
Solidarity effects of the health care reform
How did the reform of health insurance influence solidar-
ity? As discussed earlier, we address this question for each 
dimension of solidarity separately.
Table 2: Main characteristics of recent reforms in health care insurance and long-term care insurance.
Reform of health care insurance (2006) Reform of long-term care (2007 and 2015)
Reform objectives •	 Strengthening solidarity
•	 Strengthening efficiency
•	 Enhancing individual choice
•	 Controlling expenditure growth
•	 Strengthening efficiency
•	 Improving client-orientation
•	 More emphasis on individual responsibility
•	 Preservation of solidarity in future
Insurance landscape 
before reform*
•	 Sickness Fund Act (66%)
•	 Substitutive private insurance (33%)
•	 Exceptional Medical Expenses Act (AWBZ) (100%)
Insurance landscape 
after reform*
•	 Health Insurance Act 2006 (100%) •	 New Long-term Care Act (2015)
•	 Social Welfare Act (2007), revised in 2015
•	 Health Insurance Act (2006)
Institutional reforms •	 Introduction of regulated competition •	 Decentralization of social services to local government
•	 Decentralization of community nursing to 
health insurers
Financial measures •	 No expenditure cuts
•	 Extra expenses (tax credit system, state 
grant)
•	 Expenditure cuts
* Percentages represent the fraction of the population covered.
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An important policy objective of the reform was to 
strengthen solidarity by integrating the sick fund scheme 
and private health insurance into a single and manda-
tory scheme covering the entire population. Hence, the 
reform reinforced solidarity on the dimension of popula-
tion coverage.
The reform had little consequences for material cov-
erage. The benefit package of the new scheme largely 
 coincided with the package of the former sick fund scheme 
and has been subject to adaptations ever since by adding 
new services and delisting others. Whether material cov-
erage has increased for former privately-insured people is 
contingent upon the specific regulations in their private 
insurance policy. However, we expect these changes to be 
small because private insurers usually copied the benefit 
package of the sick fund scheme.
The 2006 reform had consequences for sick fund sub-
scribers on the dimension of cost coverage. To reinforce 
individual responsibility, the new insurance scheme 
includes a mandatory deductible that has been raised 
from €150 in 2008 to €385 in 2018. However, GP con-
sultations, health care for children, maternity care and 
a few other health services are exempted from the man-
datory deductible. Policyholders may also opt for a vol-
untary deductible to a maximum of €500 in exchange 
for a lower premium (12% did so in 2017; see Vektis 
[2018]). We conclude that the introduction of the man-
datory deductible has decreased cost coverage for former 
sick fund subscribers. The fraction of private payments 
in health insurance jumped from 4.2% in 2010 to 7.2% 
in 2015 (Table 3). The effect of the reform for privately 
insured persons is contingent on the specific coverage 
regulations in their policy in the pre-reform era. For most 
of them, co-payments have decreased.
The increase of the mandatory deductible has been 
controversial in Dutch health care policymaking, the 
more so because research suggests it may induce patients 
to abstain from medical care for financial reasons (Van 
Esch et al., 2017). Under heavy political pressure, the 
government decided not to raise the mandatory deduct-
ible in 2017 and 2018. This political measure caused a 
slight drop of the fraction of co-payments for health care. 
For former privately insured persons, the consequences 
for cost coverage are contingent on the specific conditions 
in their private health plan.
The 2006 reform did not change the conditions for the 
provision of health care, neither for former sick fund sub-
scribers, nor for the former privately insured persons.
The introduction of the new health insurance scheme 
did not alter risk solidarity for former sick fund subscribers. 
The new scheme draws upon the principle of risk solidarity. 
As spelt out above, legislation includes a ban on risk-rating 
and preferred risk selection. Insurers were also obligated to 
accept each applicant. Risk solidarity has increased for for-
mer privately insured persons, because risk solidarity was 
largely absent in private health insurance. They must also 
pay a premium for their children. Under the new health 
insurance regime, this is no longer the case, because now 
the state pays for children under 18.
Without compensatory measures, the raise of the nomi-
nal (flat-rate) premium in health insurance from €380 in 
2005 to an average of €1060 and an average of €1262 
in 2016 (Vektis 2016) would have meant a significant 
decrease of income solidarity for former sick fund sub-
scribers. To uphold the principle of income solidarity, the 
government introduced a tax credit system to compen-
sate persons on low income (approximately 3.5 million 
single persons and 1 million families qualified for this tax 
credit in 2017 (Budget Estimate Ministry of Health, 2018). 
Income solidarity is new for persons with private insur-
ance in the pre-reform period.
Solidarity in long-term care insurance 
after reform
Long-term care was reformed in 2007 and 2015 (see 
Table 2). The 2007 reform was rather limited in scope 
and included a transfer of some social services of long-
term care (in particular household services) from the 
benefit package of the Exceptional Medical Expenses 
Act to the newly introduced Social Welfare Act (Wet 
Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning). The new and tax-
funded regime made municipalities responsible for the 
purchase of these services. Assuming that municipali-
ties could organize the purchase of social services much 
more efficiently than the former regional care offices, 
the government imposed an ‘efficiency’ cut of 10% on 
the state budget of these services.
A more radical reform with multiple objectives (see 
Table 2) followed in 2015 (Maarse & Jeurissen, 2016). 
One reform objective was the preservation of solidarity. 
In the government’s view, solidarity in long-term care 
insurance would come under increasing strain without 
radical cost-saving measures to reign in expenditure 
growth. The willingness of the population to share the 
costs of others would decline. An important element of 
the reform was the introduction of the Long-term Care 
Act (Wet Langdurige Zorg) and the simultaneous repeal of 
the Exceptional Medical Expenses Act. The benefit pack-
age of the new scheme is largely limited to 24/7 care in 
a residential setting. Insurers are responsible for the pur-
chase of community nursing and personal care under the 
Health Insurance Act and municipalities for the purchase 
Table 3: Co-payments (CP) as percentage of expenditures for health care (HCE) and long-term care (LTCE).
2010 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Mandatory deductible (€) 220 350 360 375 385 385 385
CPs as % of total HCE 4.2 6.1 7.0 7.2 7.0 6.9 6.8
CP as % of total LTCE 6.9 7.0 6.7 8.7 9.0 8.7 8.7
Source: Ministry of Health, Annual Budget Estimate.
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of services of social support under the revised Social 
Welfare Act. The new Long-term Care Act is financed by 
means of income-related contributions set by the state 
and some tax funding. The Social Welfare Act is a tax-
funded scheme.
An important difference between the reform of health 
care insurance and long-term care insurance is that the 
reform of long-term care insurance was associated with 
a substantial budgetary cutback. The initial target was to 
cut total expenditures by about 10%, but this percent-
age was reduced to build a political majority in the Upper 
Chamber and to get support from employer and worker 
organizations as well as municipalities. The reform of 
health care insurance did not contain cutbacks, and its 
introduction cost €4 billion to fund the tax credit system 
(Maarse et al., 2015).
Solidarity effects of the long-term care reform
How did the reform of long-term care insurance influence 
solidarity? We follow the same procedure as in the previ-
ous section on health insurance reform.
The reforms of long-term care had no repercussions 
for population coverage. The former Medical Expenses 
Act and both the new Long-term Care Act and the Social 
Welfare Act set up universal schemes covering all legal 
residents in the Netherlands.
The effect of the reforms on material coverage in long-
term care is somewhat ambiguous. Most services once 
covered by the Exceptional Medical Expenses Act are 
now covered under the Long-term Care Act (mainly 24/7 
care in a residential setting), the Health Insurance Act 
(community nursing) and the revised Social Welfare Act 
(social services of long-term care). Each of these regimes 
confer upon clients the right to care, provided they meet 
the criteria for need assessment. However, there are also 
some important changes. The new regime no longer 
covers the costs of residential homes for the elderly 
(verzorgingshuizen). However, the facilities for long-term 
care at home have been extended (‘complete package at 
home’). Another change is that the revised Social Welfare 
Act gives municipalities some discretionary room in 
determining the material coverage of their local social 
welfare regime (see further conditional coverage).
Long-term care reform had significant consequences for 
cost coverage (see Table 3). The fraction of private co-pay-
ments increased from 6.7% in 2014 to 9% in 2016. This rise 
is controversial, and the new government has announced 
and taken measures to mitigate the rise of the fraction 
of co-payments in long-term care insurance (the fraction 
in 2018 was down to 8.7%). The effects on cost coverage 
under the Social Welfare Act are different. Legislation 
offers municipalities much freedom in determining their 
local co-payment regime. Unfortunately, there are no 
complete data on the amount of co-payments, but there 
are indications that many municipalities have taken the 
opportunity to raise their co-payment rates (many of them 
are income-related) as compensation for the state-imposed 
expenditure cuts for social support (De Koster, 2015). The 
municipalities’ discretionary power also caused inter-
municipality variation in co-payments (De Koster, 2015). 
This variation is considered unfair and is one of the reasons 
for the new government (in office since 2017) announcing 
the introduction of a uniform and moderate co-payment 
regime. Another reason to mitigate the effect of higher 
co-payment rates. It is no coincidence that municipalities 
have protested against this measure. Our estimation is that 
the new arrangement will largely eliminate the initial neg-
ative effect on the dimension of cost coverage.
The criteria for need assessment have been tightened 
under the Long-term Care Act. Only clients who need 24/7 
care and for whom no alternative at home is available are 
admitted to a residential facility. Hence, solidarity on the 
conditioning dimension of long-term care has decreased. 
The solidarity-effect is rather complicated for social ser-
vices covered by the revised Social Welfare Act. Legislation 
leaves municipalities much policy discretion in setting 
the criteria for need assessment, although means-testing 
remains forbidden. This not only enables a legal option for 
municipalities to condition the eligibility for social sup-
port by taking factors such as the rest capacity and the 
social network of the applicants into account, it also offers 
them the opportunity to determine what kind of support 
and how much support applicants qualify for (Hofman & 
Pennings, 2013). The decentralization of need assessment 
has caused inter-municipality variation in access to social 
support services (De Koster, 2015). Recipients consider 
this variation unfair and a threat to solidarity. However, 
the municipality’s discretionary power is restricted. Some 
municipalities had to revise their assessment procedures 
due to court rulings stating these procedures violated the 
regulations of the Social Welfare Act.
The reform did not affect solidarity on the dimension of 
income-solidarity and risk-solidarity. As under the previ-
ous regime, long-term care is largely financed by income-
related contributions and taxes. Risk-rating does not exist.
Table 4 summarizes the results of our analysis.
Discussion
This article presented an analysis of the solidarity-effects 
of two recent reforms in the Dutch health and long-term 
care system. Our research questions were (1) what are the 
effects of the 2006 reform of health insurance and the 
2015 reform of long-term care insurance on solidarity in 
health care and long-term care respectively, and (2) did 
the reforms have a similar or different effect on solidarity 
in both insurance schemes?
The following conclusions can be drawn (see Table 3). 
First, reforms have influenced solidarity in both schemes, 
but their influence should not be overstated. Second, the 
reform of health care insurance has increased solidarity 
on several dimensions (population coverage, material 
coverage, risk solidarity and income solidarity). We found 
no evidence of similar effects in long-term care insur-
ance. Third, while the reform of long-term care insurance 
decreased solidarity on two dimensions (cost coverage and 
conditional coverage), the reform of health care insurance 
decreased solidarity on the dimension of cost coverage 
only. Fourth, because any decrease of cost coverage seems 
controversial in Dutch health politics, the government has 
taken steps to mitigate the decrease of cost coverage.
Our study suggests that, at least so far, health care and 
long-term care have remained largely ‘immune’ to reforms 
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that restrict the scope of solidarity. This result is less sur-
prising than might appear at first sight. Health care is a 
sensitive issue in Dutch health politics, and the same is 
true for long-term care, which features a high degree of 
public support. There was (and probably is) no political 
majority for reforms that erode solidarity. In other words, 
the principle of solidarity has worked as a political con-
straint to health reforms. In this context, it comes as no 
surprise that the government is working on the (partial) 
remediation of cost coverage.
The most radical change concerns the provision of social 
services of long-term care under the revised Social Welfare 
Act. One explanation for this result is municipalities bear 
the financial risk of the provision of these services and seek 
ways to absorb the effect of the government’s expenditure 
cuts that have been sold politically as ‘efficiency cuts’. A 
second and complementary explanation is that social ser-
vices, such as cleaning, shopping, doing dishes and per-
sonal guidance, refer to ‘soft needs’. Hence, these services 
are an easier target for reduction than the ‘hard needs’ for 
medical care and long-term care facilities for frail elderly. 
Also notice the change in wording. Expenses for social ser-
vices of long-term care are no longer considered medical 
expenses, as was the case under the former Exceptional 
Medical Expenses Act, but social welfare expenses. The 
reform of long-term care insurance was also intended to 
de-medicalize social services of long-term care.
An important question is how future reforms will 
influence solidarity in Dutch health care insurance and 
long-term care insurance. After all, our study only cov-
ers a limited period (about two decades) and forecasts 
are always tricky. However, the political logic of the policy 
path so far does not make radical changes likely in the 
near future. In this respect, it should be noted that the 
budgetary plans of the new government for the period 
2017–2021 include an increase of €2 billion to further 
improve the quality of long-term care in nursing homes.
Solidarity
For our analysis, we developed a multidimensional model 
of solidarity that was specifically designed to investigate 
the solidarity-effects of reforms in national health and 
long-term care insurance. As already pointed out in the sec-
tion on solidarity, the model leaves various manifestations 
of solidarity in social life out of consideration. One aspect 
of our model of solidarity deserves special attention. It 
conceptualizes private payments for health care and long-
term care as the opposite of solidarity. A decrease in cost 
coverage is measured as a decrease in solidarity. This con-
ceptualization may be criticized by arguing that solidarity 
in national health insurance cannot be sustainable with-
out individual responsibility. Following this reasoning, 
solidarity and individual responsibility are two sides of the 
same coin. Hence, it is both fair and necessary (to minimize 
the risk of moral hazard) that patients bear a portion of the 
costs of health care or long-term care themselves. Which 
portion they should pay is a matter of political preference.
In the Dutch health system, this view on solidarity is 
not very popular. Many people consider co-payments for 
health care and long-term care at odds with solidarity. 
Popular resistance to co-payments – sometimes framed as 
a ‘fine on illness’ – helps to explain the political pressure 
on the government to remedy cost coverage. This practice 
suggests that solidarity is also a matter of political culture.
Generalizability
Our analysis is a country-based case study and, hence, 
does not allow for generalizations. International-com-
parative research of recent reforms of health care (OECD, 
2018) and long-term care (Gori et al., 2018) is required to 
assess to what extent the Dutch experience is representa-
tive for the solidarity-effects of reforms in other countries. 
Of course, much depends on the initial position of each 
country (Mosca et al., 2017) and political circumstances. 
For instance, the solidarity-effects of reforms in long-term 
care insurance may be quite different in countries with a 
rather generous system, such as the Netherlands, than in 
countries with a less generous one.
Our hypothesis is that, so far, reforms have increased 
solidarity in national health insurance in the Netherlands. 
In this respect, it is interesting to refer to a compara-
tive study of social health insurance reform in Belgium, 
Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland in the 1990s. 
The authors concluded ‘that solidarity in social health 
insurance has in many respects increased rather than 
decreased’ (Maarse & Paulus, 2003: 610). In her com-
parative analysis of long-term care reform in France and 
Germany, Morel concluded that the scope of long-term 
Table 4: Overview of the solidarity-effects.
Dimension Health care insurance Long-term care insurance
Population coverage Increased No change
Material coverage No change for former sick fund insured people. Increased material 
coverage possible for former privately insured people
Mixed changes 
Cost coverage Decreased for former sick fund insured. Effects for former privately 
insured persons contingent on the specific coverage regulations in 
their policy
Decreased cost coverage but 
 measures to mitigate this effect 
Conditional coverage No change More conditions
Income solidarity No changes for former sick fund insured. Increased solidarity for 
former privately insured people
No change
Risk solidarity No changes for former sick fund insured. Increased solidarity for 
former privately insured people
No change
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care for frail elderly has extended in both countries 
in response to the ageing of the population (Morel, 
2006; see also Doty et al., 2015). Germany also recently 
extended its public coverage for long-term care (Federal 
Ministry of Health, 2017). In their analysis of long-term 
care reforms in six European countries (France, Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK), Pavolini and 
Ranci (2008) concluded that the introduction of new gov-
ernment regulations ‘were designed to restructure rather 
than to reduce welfare programmes’ in long-term care.
Contributions to research
This article presented an analytical framework to inves-
tigate the solidarity-effects of recent reforms in national 
health insurance in the Netherlands. For that purpose, we 
developed an analytical model of solidarity. In our view, 
the model is fit for international-comparative research 
of the solidarity effects of ongoing reforms in national 
health and long-term care insurance.
A great deal of the research of health and long-term 
care reforms concentrates upon their (potential) effects 
on health and long-term care expenditures and the 
organisation of care. Our study contributes to the body of 
 knowledge on their effects on solidarity.
Finally, our study is an empirical one. We abstained from 
a political judgment of the reforms.
Limitations
This study has several limitations. First, the study is a 
case study of the Netherlands. International-comparative 
research is required to get wider insight into the solidarity-
effects of ongoing reforms elsewhere and to find out to 
what extent the Dutch experience corresponds and  differs 
from that of other countries. Systematic comparative 
research can also increase knowledge on the set of factors 
mediating these solidarity-effects.
A second limitation concerns our analytical framework. 
The framework is apt for studying the solidarity-effects of 
reforms on national health and long-term care insurance. 
Its focus is on formal arrangements of solidarity. Effects on 
informal arrangements are beyond the scope of this study.
Third, our study takes only an aggregate view of soli-
darity effects. More detailed and quantitative research is 
needed to investigate how the reforms played out for spe-
cific groups, for instance the frail elderly, people with a 
handicap and people with rare diseases.
Conclusions
Reforms of health care insurance and long-term care 
insurance in the Netherlands had solidarity-effects, but 
these effects should not be overstated. We found evidence 
for both increased and decreased solidarity. Health care 
insurance seems more ‘immune’ to reductions in solidar-
ity than long-term care insurance. The impact upon soli-
darity of the reforms for specific groups of people and in 
the long term requires further investigation.
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